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Abstract
This article proposes the thesis that Edith Stein’s late anthropology has 
a theocentric orientation. The threefold structure of a human being consisting of 
a body, soul and spirit is examined in order to validate the thesis. First of all, the 
finitude of a human being points out to the eternal being and – consequently – human 
beings are not conceivable by themselves, without the context of God. Moreover, the 
hylomorphic union of the body and soul adopted from Aristotelian and Thomistic 
philosophy is enriched in Stein’s anthropology by the concept of spirit. This results 
in a threefold structure and is reason enough to suggest man’s iconic similarity to 
the Trinity. Furthermore, Stein takes over St. Teresa of Avila’s concept of an internal 
center of the soul, which can be a meeting point between a person and God. The 
analysis of the soul’s center supports the main thesis1.
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Edith Stein’s life consisted of one exceptional event after another. Her 
childhood decision to abandon Jewish faith and admit to atheism, stopping 
her education at a young age when she did not feel it was right to continue, 
1 In this article in order to refer to a human being I will use the terms ‘human being’ and ‘man’ 
interchangeably. In doing so I follow the English translations of Stein’s writing as well as some 
English commentaries on her work. A number of English authors use the term ‘human person’ in 
reference to Stein’s anthropology, which I shall not do. In rare instances, when referring to passages 
in which Stein used the German word ‘die Person’ instead of ‘der Mensch’, I will use the English 
word ‘person’.
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her critical and strong headed approach to psychology that made her search 
for a well-founded discipline of thought, the passionate phenomenological 
research she did by the side of Edmund Husserl, her dramatic decision to 
receive baptism in Catholic Church despite strong family tradition, her 
uncompromising rejection of all atheistic thinking after conversion and 
joining the Discalced Carmelite Order at the mature age of forty two having 
known that it meant her mother’s final rejection – needless to say, these all are 
signs of a strong, independent and non-conformist character. It is, therefore, 
no wonder that the history of Edith Stein’s life intrigues to such an extent 
that it almost overshadows one of the most important aspects of her life – her 
thinking.
A careful reading of Edith Stein’s autobiographical work2 leads to the 
conclusion that it was philosophy that played the most notable role in her life. 
And it was the human being that played the central part in her philosophy. 
Throughout her whole life Stein kept asking the same anthropological question: 
what is a human being? In the early stages of her philosophical reflection 
she searched for the answer using Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological 
methodology. After converting to Catholicism her anthropology needed a new 
theoretical foundation. A temporary decision to abandon all philosophical, 
hence non-dogmatic – as she all too quickly assumed – research was followed 
by the acceptance of the foundation she discovered in the works of early 
Christian philosophers such as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, the Church 
Fathers, particularly St. Augustine of Hippo and medieval scholastic thinkers, 
especially St. Thomas Aquinas. As already stated, the anthropological 
question remained Stein’s focal point in most of her work3. The answer to 
2 The collection of letters: Selbstbildnis in Briefen I (1916–1933), Freiburg 2010, Herder; 
Selbstbildnis in Briefen II (1933–1942), Freiburg 2006, Herder, both volumes are translated in 
English in one volume: Self-Portrait In Letters, 1916–1942, trans. J. Koeppel, OCD, Washington 
1993, ICS Publications; Selbstbildnis in Briefen III: Briefe an Roman Ingarden, Freiburg 2005, 
Herder, as well as the history of Stein’s family written already after she joined Carmelite: Aus 
dem Leben einer jüdischen Familie und weitere autobiographische Beiträge, Freiburg 2010, 
Herder, English translation: Life in a Jewish family, trans. J. Koeppel OCD, Washington 1986, ICS 
Publications.
3 The doctoral dissertation Zum Problem der Einfühlung, Freiburg 2010, Herder, English 
translation: On the problem of empathy, trans. W. Stein, Washington 1989, ICS Publications; the 
winter semester lectures at The German Pedagogical Institute: Was is der Mensch? Theologische 
Anthropologie, Freiburg 2005, Herder; the spring semester lectures: Der Aufbau der menschlichen 
Person. Vorlesung zum Philosophischen Anthropologie, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1994, Herder, 
Freiburg 2010; Die Frau, Freiburg 2010, Herder, translated in English by F. M. Oben, Essays 
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the question about the human being, however, changed over time. Her early 
reflection was a contribution to Husserl’s phenomenological school and shows 
little signs of interest in man as God’s creation. Her later reflection, on the 
contrary, perceives the human person as nonsensical without the context of 
his maker.
The aim of this article is to discuss this dependence, of a human being 
on God, in Stein’s later anthropology4. The term proposed in this article 
in order to describe God’s role in Stein’s post-conversion anthropology is 
‘theocentrism’. This article will first discuss this term and its origin and will 
proceed to the representation of crucial elements of Stein’s late anthropology 
that show the central role of God in a human being’s structure and existence. 
The main thesis proposed in this article states that in Stein’s late anthropology 
a man is not conceivable when deprived from the context of God.
1. Theocentricity
The term ‘theocentrism’ and its antonym – egocentrism – appear in 
Stein’s non-academic text written in order to honor Edmund Husserl’s 
seventieth birthday. The paper entitled What is philosophy? A conversation 
between Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas was published in 1929 in the 
Phenomenological Yearly Book edited by Husserl5. It comprises the dialogue 
on Woman, Washington, 1996, ICS Publications; Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions 
Nauwelaerts; Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, the new edition: 
Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg 2013, Herder; English translation: Finite and eternal being, 
trans. K. F. Reinhardt, Washington 2002, ICS Publications; Geistliche Texte I, Freiburg 2014, 
Herder; Geistliche Texte II, Freiburg 2007, Herder.
4 I focus on the post-conversion papers, for the detailed list see all works enlisted in footnote 2, 
except for Stein’s Ph.D. thesis – Zum Problem der Einfühlung – written before the conversion. I do 
not discuss Stein’s latest publication Kreuzeswissenschaft, which was devoted to the interpretation 
of Saint John of the Cross’s writings. It is, however, the case that Stein’s latest work circles around 
anthropological questions as much as the earlier one.
5 The text published in the Yearly Book was shortened according to editor’s (whom at a time 
was Martin Heidegger) demand and given a title: Husserls Phänomenologie und die Philosophie 
des hl. Thomas von Aquino: Versuch einer Gegenüberstellung, in: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung, Festschrift fur Edmund Husserl, zum 70. Geburstag gewidmet, 
Halle 1929 p. 315–338. It also did not have a dialogical form but that of an academic paper. 
Translated in English by M. C. Baseheart, Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas. Attempt at comparison, in: Person in the World: Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Edith Stein, Dordrecht 1997, Kluwer, p. 129–144 and 179–180. The full version of this text in 
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between St. Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Husserl, in which the prolocutors 
discuss the proper object of philosophy and a number of methodological 
issues. Not least among them is the topic of basic axioms of philosophy. 
The imaginary St. Thomas rightly argues that Husserl’s phenomenological 
method leads him to accept a subject – an ego – as the starting point and 
center of philosophy6. Thomas himself took on a different course: accepted 
God as truth, a first principle and a criterion for truth of every part of creation. 
Establishing God as an axiom results in St. Thomas’s philosophy having 
a theocentric orientation, whereas establishing the ego as an axiom makes 
Husserl’s phenomenology have an egocentric one: ‘From the different goals 
that are posited and the different conceptions of the ground of certitude there 
had to result a completely different orienting of the total philosophy’7.
The original use of the term ‘theocentrism’ differs in one aspect from the 
one proposed in this article. Stein’s theocentricity applies to her philosophical 
system as a whole, whereas in this article the term theocentricity applies to 
her anthropology. The term used in this article is therefore narrower in its 
scope. Apart from that limitation, the semantics of the term remains as it 
originally appeared in Stein’s work: Stein’s anthropology is theocentric in the 
sense that it conceives a human being to have his first principle in God, who 
conditions the creation of a man and remains a necessary, shaping element of 
his existence.
During a series of lectures on anthropology, which Stein gave at The 
German Pedagogical Institute in the winter and spring semesters of 1932 and 
1933, she admitted the above described orientation of her anthropology8. 
The being, that is the subject of her research, has the essential property of 
finitude – she argued in the ninth lecture. As such, it cannot be completely 
understood by itself, since it always points out to the first being which is 
its original, dialogical form was published in the 15th volume of Edith Steins Werke: Erkenntnis 
und Glaube, Freiburg 1993, Herder, entitled Was Ist Philosophie? Ein Gespräch zwischen Edmund 
Husserl und Thomas von Aquino.
6 E. Stein, Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Attempt at 
comparison, in: M. C. Baseheart, Person in the World: Introduction to the Philosophy of Edith 
Stein, Dordrecht 1997, Kluwer, p. 135.
7 Ibid.
8 E. Stein, Was is der Mensch? Theologische Anthropologie, Freiburg 2005, Herder; E. Stein, 
Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person. Vorlesung zum Philosophischen Anthropologie, Freiburg 
2010, Herder.
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eternal or – to be more precise – which is eternity itself.9 Such a being, Stein 
called God, since it has properties corresponding to the idea of God. According 
to her ontological conviction, a human being – as well as everything that is 
finite – points to God and would not be graspable without the relation to God: 
in both that it is (exists) and in what it is. God is the theoretical framework in 
which a human being makes sense.
This brief recapitulation of the orientation of Stein’s late anthropology 
leaves us with little doubt: Stein was clearly convinced that a human is not 
comprehensible without the eternal being of God. At the very beginning 
of her anthropological research she accepted what, in respect to Aquinas’s 
philosophy, she called a theocentric orientation. The justification for her doing 
so lies in man’s finitude.
2. Finitude
Stein’s treatment of the term ‘finitude’ is not merely an assertion of the 
fact that a man has his beginning in a Godly act of creation. This by itself 
is a classical religious understanding of man’s appearance in the world as 
a consequence of divine creation. The manifold meanings of the term 
‘finitude’ include the fact that whatever is finite is also temporal, as a result 
of having a beginning. Temporality, in turn, indicates a dynamic character. 
Stein concluded that finitude signifies a being that does not possess its own 
existence, and in order to achieve existence, it needs time. Time is necessary, 
for a being that has a beginning, in order to become what it is – she wrote10. 
Moreover, man as a finite being, always has but a temporal existence, and 
has no control over his beginning, nor complete control over his end. In other 
words, the finite being is not a master of existence – there is only one such 
master and it is, needless to say, an eternal being who knows no limits11. 
Therefore, the finitude of a man, mankind’s basic characteristic, always calls 
for a limitless being. The above represented initial conceptualization of a man 
as finite remains in accordance with the proclaimed theocentric orientation 
9 E. Stein, Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person. Vorlesung zum Philosophischen 
Anthropologie, Freiburg 2010, Herder, lecture IX.
10 E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, p. 60.
11 Ibid.
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of Stein’s anthropology. The question we now ought to ask is: ‘What are the 
other essential features of man?’.
3. The body–soul–spirit structure
First of all, a human being has a body-soul-spirit structure.12 This statement 
takes us back to the First Letter to Thessalonians in which St. Paul uses the 
soul-body-spirit distinction13, without any elaboration on it, however. Stein’s 
recapitulation of it is coherent with dogmatic thought, yet it is a step away 
from St. Thomas’s views. Aquinas inherited an Aristotelian vision of man as 
a hylomorphic unity of body and soul. In her basic conceptualization of the 
structure of man, Stein reaches to St. Paul’s triadic view presenting a man as 
a union of three elements: body, soul and spirit; a view present in the work 
of Origen. Thereby, she departs from Aquinas’s dual understanding of man, 
not abandoning the scholastic vision of a man as a composition (gr. synolon) 
of a form and matter, however. The choice of reaching to St. Paul’s structure 
is justified by the iconic character of man. Stein’s reasoning is very much in 
line with St. Augustine’s argumentation from De Trinitate14: since man has 
been created in the image of God, and God is the Trinity, therefore signs 
of this Trinity ought to be present in man. Stein follows in St. Augustine’s 
footsteps when she sets out to discover the traces of the Trinity in creation. 
She is original, nevertheless, in finding God’s image in the basic structure 
of body, soul and spirit. The identification of the threefold structure with the 
iconic character of man remains in line with theocentric orientation.
Body, soul and spirit create an inseparable unity, they each have, however, 
a distinct meaning. A few comments about each are in order.
3.1. The body
Stein’s understanding of a human body in her late anthropology has much 
in common with what she wrote about in her early phenomenological period. 
In her doctoral dissertation, On the problem of empathy, she differentiated 
12 Ibid., p. 336.
13 1 Thessalonians, 5: 23.
14 St. Augustine, On the Trinity, trans. A. W. Haddan, Books IX-XV, online source: 
- http://www.logoslibrary.org/augustine/trinity/index.html (20.05.2014).
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between a living body – Leib – and a physical body – Körper15. A living body 
has a unique property of the possibility of being perceived from within, and 
a physical body can only be perceived from the outside: that is what makes the 
crucial difference between the same body when it is alive or dead. In her later 
anthropology Stein still held this basic distinction together with a number of 
phenomenological findings on the givenness of the living body. In the work 
entitled Natur, Freiheit und Gnade, that was known under an incorrect title 
Die ontische Struktur der Person und ihre erkenntnistheoretische Problematik 
and was written just after Stein’s conversion, she repeated that distinction16. 
Were she to stop her theorization at this point there would be no real reason 
to detect theocentrism in her concept of a body. Yet Stein enriched her 
phenomenological research with a number of thoughts inspired by scholastic 
philosophy and Christian mystical works.
First of all, she accepted a hylomorphic understanding of the body-soul 
relation: the living body consists of matter shaped by the soul which has 
a capacity to form something17. Secondly, she established a hierarchy between 
the shaping and the shaped: a body is to be subordinated to a soul and serve as 
an instrument of a person’s activity18. This does not result in Stein accepting 
an anti-somatic standpoint: the living body is a mirror that reflects the life of 
a soul and has, therefore, a dignity of what it reflects. The structure of body 
and soul is directed towards the inner life (Innenleben19) and a body performs 
its functions best when it causes no disturbances to that inner life20. The body-
soul relation might take on a different character, however, especially in the 
case of uncontrolled bodily instincts keeping the person away from entering 
15 E. Stein, On the problem of empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein, Washington 1989, ICS 
Publications, p. 41.
16 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, p. 172. She writes: ‘Der 
Leib ist als solcher charakterisiert und von dem puren materiellen Körper, der ihn mitkonstituiert, 
dadurch abgehoben, daß alle seine Zustände und alles, was ihm widerfährt, gespürt wird oder 
doch gespürt werden kann. Alles Leibliche hat eine Innenseite, wo Leib ist, da ist auch ein inneres 
Leben’.
17 E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, p. 229.
18 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, p. 175–176.
19 Ibid., p. 175.
20 This does not mean that people are naturally self-reflective, rather than engaged in the world. 
In the later work, Endliches und ewiges Sein, chapter VII, § 9 Das Gottesbild im Menschen, point 
4. Das Innere der Seele, Stein elaborates on a person’s tendency to reach out to the world and 
a difficulty to stay inside. The call to go back inside comes from the conscience, a successful 
preaching or as a result of an important life happening.
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the internal life. Stein was aware of such possibilities and remained convinced 
that true richness lies inside the human ready to be discovered. The body is 
just an external, material manifestation of a person and a tool for the soul to 
live its life. The richness that lies within is non-material, it is spiritual. Stein 
called it with a term derived from St. Teresa of Avila’s most important work, 
Castillo interior o las Moradas: an internal castle (Die Seelenburg21).
3.2. The soul
Stein understood the soul not just as a non-material, formal element of the 
body-soul-spirit triad, an Aristotelian morphē in Greek terms. Following in 
the footsteps of the Spanish mystic she understood the soul also as an internal 
structure of layers of depth alike St. Teresa of Avila’s castle. She did not go too 
far in following St. Teresa’s thought: it was not her interest to describe the kinds 
of peripheral and internal chambers of that castle22 – she did however accept 
the idea of the most cardinal chamber. The conceptualization of that chamber 
is particularly interesting for our investigation of Stein’s theocentricity.
3.3. Center of the soul
The most internal part of a person is called either the center or the depth. 
It is located so deep that one cannot easily come in touch with it. This very 
center of the soul is the source of human activity, freedom and inspiration. 
Stein wrote about it: ‘Das Getriebe des natürlichen Seelenlebens rührt nicht 
an das Zentrum, das der Ort der Freiheit und die Ursprungsstelle der Aktivität 
ist. Die geleitete Seele horcht mit eben diesem Zentrum nach oben, empfängt 
hier die Weisungen von oben und läßt sich von hier aus gehorsam durch sie 
bewegen. Die Aktivität ist an ihrer Ursprungsstelle unterbunden, von der 
Freiheit wird am Ort der Freiheit kein Gebrauch gemacht’23. The above stated 
directedness of the center of the soul towards something higher discloses an 
important aspect. The soul’s center is a source of some of a person’s movements 
or inspirations: those originating ‘above’. The ‘above’ is a reference to the 
21 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, p. 39.
22 Saint Teresa of Avila identifies seven chambers including the peripheral chambers 
representing human involvement in the external world, more internal rooms representing self-
reflection and a central, seventh chamber inhabited by The Ruler of the Castle – God Himself. She 
describes the gate to the castle: prayer. For more see Saint Teresa of Jesus, The interior castle or the 
mansions, trans. Benedictines from Stanbrook, London 1921, Thomas Baker.
23 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, p. 138.
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eternal being of God. The center is, therefore, the domain of a person where 
something other than a human being can enter: it is the most internal part of 
a man, yet external to him, since it can be filled with somebody’s else’s ideas.
This understanding of the soul’s center filled with God’s inspirations 
or even – in some occasions – inhabited by God is probably the most 
explicit formulation of the theocentricity of Stein’s late anthropology. Here 
theocentricity means – almost literally – that God’s inspirations are present in 
a human’s center24. A couple of remarks about that connection of the center 
with God are necessary here.
Firstly, let us regard the perplexities of Stein’s description of that connection. 
She wrote about a center that is anchored (verankert25) above. This means that 
the center is sturdily, yet temporally connected to God but not necessarily 
that God is in any way present in the deepest part of a human’s soul. Stein 
also wrote that a soul at its center is directed towards the ‘above’ and that this 
center remains passive in receiving movements or inspirations. This also does 
not imply the actual presence of God in a human’s most internal domain. We 
should be careful to note the difference between the internal part of the soul 
being connected to the ‘above’ from which it receives movements and the 
internal part being filled with God’s presence.
Some other fragments of Stein’s work might give rise to the idea that God 
can at times be present in a human’s center. Those are, however, exceptional 
instances. In Endliches und ewiges Sein26 Stein described The Ascent of 
Mount Carmel by St. John of the Cross in short: the difficulties of directing 
oneself towards the inside, the initial bewilderment of soul’s silent center, 
the disturbing need of activity, the struggle of suppressing this need to act 
and eventually the experience of an event that keeps a person inside. By this 
Stein related to what the masters of mystical life called unio mystica: after the 
humble effort of awaiting at the depth of the inside – a sudden intrusion of 
a higher, supernatural, godly life. At such a moment of grace a human is given 
an experience of what faith teaches: the idea that God inhabits a human’s soul. 
In such a context a soul might be called a house for God. In the case of unio 
24 The expression is not used literally, since ‘the center’ is not understood as a location in 
space. The soul is a non-material substance, so it cannot have a spatial centre. 
25 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, p. 138, the same expression 
is repeated in Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, for example p. 408.
26 E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, p. 406–408.
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mystica the center of a human’s structure is in fact filled with God’s presence. 
Stein wrote: ‘Der Mittelpunkt der Seele ist der Ort, von dem aus die Stimme 
des Gewissens sich vernehmen läßt, und der Ort der freien persönlichen 
Enscheidung. Weil es so ist und weil zur liebenden Vereinigung mit Gott die 
freie persönliche Hingabe gehört, darum muß der Ort der freien Entscheidung 
zugleich der Ort der freien Vereinigung mit Gott sein’27. The precondition of 
the God-human union is that both united elements are made out of the same 
substance. God is a spirit and it is a human’s spirit – the third element of the 
structure of a man – that makes the union of the two possible. We have stated 
that a soul is not material but spiritual. The question arises then – how do the 
soul and the spirit differ from one another? Before we answer that, a final 
remark on the soul is needed.
Besides the soul being a center point in the sense that it is the deepest point 
of a person, a soul is the center in yet another meaning: it is the element of 
the triadic structure that mediates between the other two: body and spirit, and 
thereby is centrally located in the whole structure28. Being an in-between 
element does not imply that a soul is a third part of the person, next to body and 
spirit. In order to explain why, I will return to the above stated question about 
the difference between soul and spirit and focus on Stein’s understanding of 
a human spirit.
3.4. The spirit
The most characteristic feature of a human spirit is its dynamicity29. The 
spirit is that which remains present at all times in a man’s soul and at the same 
time reaches out to the world. In doing so, the spirit loses none of its potency. 
This activity of a soul has a lot in common with the Neoplatonic idea of the 
profusion of good: it can also endlessly give itself away, losing none of its 
potency. The spiritual aspect of a man is responsible for interferences with 
the world. This is why Stein frequently talks about the domain of spirit or the 
27 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, Die Seelenburg, p. 67.
28 E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, p. 342–343, 
also E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, Die Seelenburg, p. 39: ‘In 
unserem Zusammenhang ist die rein theoretische Aufgabe zu lösen, im Stufenbau des Seienden die 
Eigentümlichkeit des menschlichen Seins herauszuarbeiten, und dazu gehört die Kennzeichnung 
der Seele als der Mitte des ganzen leiblich–seelisch–geistigen Gebildes, das wir Mensch nennen’.
29 See E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, chapter VII, § 2: 
Person und Geist.
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domain which the spirit penetrates. All human activities and man-made things 
are marked by a spirit whose stamp remains in them. In order to explain this, 
a cross-reference to the idea of the soul’s center is necessary.
There is an important role which the center of a soul plays, namely, being 
the carrier of a person’s unique character. In Stein’s discussion the spirit is 
present inside a person and at the same time reaches out to the world and 
human creations, however unusual it might sound. She states that the stamp 
with which a person’s character marks all his activities is located in the depth 
of a soul. A soul is something by itself – it has its own, unique character, with 
which the whole of a man’s life is marked30. What is principium individuationis 
of each person then: the spirit or the soul?
Stein rejected the Thomistic conception of the principle of individuality 
situated in matter. St. Thomas accepted matter as a differentiating element 
of many individuals of the same kind, since he could not place principium 
individuationis in a form which – by definition – is that which is the same 
in each example of a certain kind. He settled therefore with accepting the 
second of the two: matter being a principle of a unique character of each 
person. Stein, who adopted St. Paul’s threefold structure of a man, had enough 
possibilities left in her basic distinctions to avoid St. Thomas’s conclusion. 
She identified the essence of man with the spiritual soul’s center – different 
in each person. The question raised above – whether it is the soul or the spirit 
that is the carrier of the essence of each man – overlooks the fact that a soul is 
made up of spiritual matter. This explains why the soul is not a third part of 
a person’s whole being – the soul is a structure, a form which shapes the union 
of the two substances: material (body) and spiritual (spirit). Substantialization 
of the soul leads to a false presumption that a soul is a part of a human being. 
Just as the form of a chair is not part of a chair – a soul is not part of a human 
being. Man’s position in the hierarchy of beings is in between material and 
non-spiritual creation – animals – and purely spiritual creation – angels. 
Stein does not draw the conclusion that a man is neither of those two – she 
asserts rather that a man is both of them at the same time. He is an animal and 
an angel31. What makes such a connection of the material and the spiritual 
possible is the form of the soul. As such, the soul is nothing third to body and 
spirit, though conceptually it remains different from both of them.
30 Ibid., p. 406–408.
31 Ibid., p. 342–343.
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Let us return to the idea of God’s presence at the center of a human’s soul. 
Stein’s discussion on how sacraments empower a person to reach the final 
goal of existence includes a side remark about an alternative way of God’s 
activity in a human’s soul: from within32. The concept of the depth of a soul 
makes it possible for Stein to admit that Holy Sacraments are not necessary 
for salvation. Grace, by itself, is, yet it might find its channel of work outside 
of the external sacraments – that is, through inspirations, motivations or calls 
of conscience coming from within. Therefore, Stein holds that the center of 
a soul is in God’s hands, more than it is in man’s. It remains a domain of God’s 
free activity, even if the external engagement of a person in the world does not 
aim at receiving grace.
The concept of the center of a soul, a principle of man’s unique character, 
ought to be confronted with a phenomenological term used by Stein in her late 
anthropology, namely pure ego.
3.5. Pure ego
In her early anthropology Stein accepted Husserl’s understanding of a pure 
ego: firstly, as an empty, quality-less, otherwise indescribable subject of 
experience33, secondly, as a unity of a stream of consciousness34. In the later 
period of her thinking she kept using the phenomenological term of a pure 
ego, offering it a different understanding, however. First of all, she deviated 
from the idea that the ego has no qualities. Let us regard the following 
passage: ‘Das freie Subjekt – die Person – ist als solches gänzlich ins Leere 
ausgesetzt. Es hat sich selbst und kann sich selbst nach allen Richtungen 
bewegen und ist doch mit eben dieser absoluten Freiheit absolut in sich selbst 
fixiert und zur Bewegungslosigkeit verurteilt. Denn das Selbst, das es hat, 
ist ein völlig leeres und gewinnt alle Fülle von dem Reich, dem es sich kraft 
seiner Freiheit hingibt.’35 Stein implicitly states that the ego might achieve 
a certain fullness and qualities. In Natur, Freiheit und Gnade, the work 
32 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, p. 184.
33 E. Stein, On the problem of empathy, trans. W. Stein, Washington 1989, ICS Publications, 
p. 38. On the same subject in Stein’s later philososphy see E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, 
Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, p. 345.
34 E. Stein, On the problem of empathy, trans. W. Stein, Washington 1989, ICS Publications, 
p. 38.
35 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Die ontische Struktur der Person und ihre 
erkenntnistheoretische Problematik, Editions Nauwelaerts, p. 139, 140.
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published with an incorrect title Die ontische Struktur der Person und ihre 
erkenntnistheoretische Problematik, Stein discussed in detail how the ego 
might turn to its deepest center and fill its emptiness with inspiration, forces 
and movements originating from the Kingdom of Grace, thereby reaching 
a qualitative state.
Secondly, Stein spoke of an ego as a point of attention, a spot in 
consciousness that can travel through the internal chambers of the soul’s 
castle. She wrote: ‘Das Ich erscheint als ein beweglicher Punkt im Raum 
der Seele; wo es jeweils seinen Standort nimmt, da leuchtet das Licht des 
Bewußtseins auf und erhellt einen gewissen Umkreis: sowohl im Innern der 
Seele wie in der gegenständlichen Welt, der das Ich zugewendet ist. Trotz 
seiner Beweglichkeit ist das Ich aber doch wiederum gebunden: an jenen 
selbst unbeweglichen Mittelpunkt der Seele, in dem es eigentlich zu Hause 
ist. Hierhin wird es immer wieder gerufen und zwar – das ist wieder ein 
Punkt, in dem wir über das hinausgehen mußten, was uns die Seelenburg 
bezeugt – nicht nur zur höchsten mystischen Begnadung, der geistlichen 
Vermählung mit Gott, sondern um von hier aus die letzten Entscheidungen 
zu treffen, zu denen der Mensch als freie Person aufgerufen wird’36. An ego 
is the eye of attention which highlights a domain in a person it turns to. It is 
the decisive power in a man that is responsible for free decisions of conscious 
life. An ego is also the one that has a body, a soul and a spirit, all open for the 
ego’s exploration. A person, however, is not just an ego. A person is a unity of 
the structure of body-soul-spirit, in which the ego lives, and is filled with the 
subconscious and the unconscious. The growth of a body, for instance, is not 
the ego’s activity, yet it is the growth of an ego’s body and part of a person’s 
life. This is a step away from Stein’s early anthropology in which the pure 
ego was the subject of all acts and the unconscious ego was placed outside of 
a phenomenological analysis.
At first glance, the understanding of an ego seems free of theocentric 
elements. Let us examine it in more detail and confront it with the earlier 
accepted concept of an ego, since it is one of the terms Stein used in both her 
phenomenological and post-conversion anthropology.
In her doctoral dissertation Stein analyzed a human being within the context 
of Husserl’s early phenomenology. In the first edition of Logical Investigations 
36 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Louvain 1962, Editions Nauwelaerts, Die Seelenburg, p. 67. See 
also E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, p. 345.
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Husserl rejected Paul Natorp’s concept of a pure ego and developed 
a centerless phenomenological understanding of consciousness. Soon, he 
came to appreciate Neo-Kantian argumentation for pure ego and already in 
the second edition of Logical Investigations, as well as in other publications 
and lectures, he introduced the concept of a pure I. Pure ego eventually 
became the Archimedean point of his transcendental phenomenology. Stein, 
who became Husserl’s assistant soon after defending her doctoral dissertation, 
never accepted the idealistic turn of her teacher. In particular, the egocentric 
orientation of his Cartesian way to the transcendental reduction, was a claim 
of his philosophy which she never consented to in her own anthropology. In 
her early philosophy, she did accept an ego as a polar end of all intentions of 
consciousness – which is one of Husserl’s two basic understandings of pure 
ego – and, therefore, a center of consciousness and the subject of all acts. The 
unity of a stream of consciousness – argued Stein – is constituted by a pure 
ego, who is the one and the same polar end of each intention. The role of an 
ego is therefore essential to a person – were the latter to be deprived of the 
former, we would not be talking of a person anymore. An ego is a carrier of 
all conscious acts.
In her later anthropology, Stein rejected the pure ego as a principle 
of man’s unity. An ego remains an element of a person’s structure but not 
the stable, central point of conscious acts. The depth of a soul, also called 
a center, becomes the fixed, central element. Despite the fact that we have 
seen little hints of theocentricity in Stein’s concept of an ego so far, we have 
seen, however, an evident step away from the egocentricity of her earlier, 
phenomenologically inspired thinking37. Let us examine if there also is 
a theocentric tendency in her late work, Endliches und ewiges Sein.
In a commentary to Husserl’s concept of an ego Stein discarded 
egocentricity, at the same time making a shift towards theocentricity38. 
Husserl’s conception of a pure ego as the constituent of unity of conscious acts 
leads to the conclusion that it is an ego who is the carrier and foundation of 
his own existence. An ego would therefore be a source of his own existence. 
This – Stein argued – is not coherent with apparent facts concerning the ego’s 
37 Stein’s anthropological egocentricity was different from Husserl’s acceptance of an ego 
as the Archimedean principle of transcendental phenomenology. The central role of an ego for 
Stein meant that he is a unifying principle of the stream of consciousness and a central point of 
consciousness.
38 E. Stein, Endliches und ewiges Sein, Freiburg in Breisgau 1984, Herder, p. 46–53.
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existence: its ungraspable and mysterious beginning, unpredictable end, 
gaps in his own past and, most of all, the impossibility to upkeep his own 
existence. Were an ego a source of his own existence – he would be capable 
of maintaining it throughout time. Ego, on the contrary, is not in control of 
his persistence in time: he flows from one moment to another being kept in 
his existence by something external to him. Ego finds himself thrown into 
the existence or placed in existence (in Dasein gesetzt) and that, by itself, is 
contrary to self-sufficiency. Stein cannot but conclude that an ego’s existence 
is offered to him.
‘Who is the master of existence then?’ we should ask. An answer has 
already been mentioned above – now it will be derived from the analysis of 
ego’s experience. Once articulated, it will answer the basic question posed in 
this article about the role of God in Stein’s late anthropology.
In his experience, the ego encounters certain limitations: each present 
moment fades away, memories – once vibrant – fall into oblivion, the foresight 
of his future contains an inescapable certainty of death. Such limitations are 
what make an ego reach for the ideals of fullness and perfection, both of 
which are evidently free from the same limitations which the ego experiences. 
That is: the analysis of his experience makes an ego encounter the idea of 
an eternal being. It is this eternal being that must be a source of the ego’s 
finite life – is it therefore concluded that it is God, understood as the one 
who offers life. Here, once again, the sheer fact of a man’s finitude points 
out to an eternal being. In an earlier paragraph of this article, another aspect 
of man’s finitude was regarded – the incomprehensibility of man without 
the context of God. God was presented as a theoretical framework in which 
a finite human being makes sense. Yet another aspect of human’s finitude 
is presented here: the structure of a person is such that an ego encounters 
domains in himself which are not open to his conscious experience. One 
perceives them as limitations and searches for an idealization which would 
be free of them. This idealization is God.
The fact of being offered existence and an experience of limits in his own 
being are the two aspects of Stein’s concept of an ego that include a reference 
to God. Let us consider the reference to each other. Since God is the one 
who offers being to ego and since ego is inseparable from his own existence, 
the offering of life is a precondition of an ego himself. The role of God, 
for an ego, is indispensible then. To name God’s position central is not an 
overstatement.
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4. Self-development
Finally, let us mention the self-development of a person. In her more 
practice orientated work, Die Frau39, Stein considers an individual task each 
human being ought to realize in his or her life. In order to develop his or 
her individuality and a true, unique version of humanity one needs: firstly, 
to understand a particular task given to him or her and, secondly, to muster 
up enough courage to perform this task. The former – understanding of 
the task – points to God who is the author of an idea for the best scenario 
of each person’s life. The latter – courage – is, similarly, directed towards 
God, since it is God’s gift. In her understanding of individuality – a term 
that in contemporary philosophy often is a corner stone for egocentric 
anthropology – Stein remains faithful to her initial understanding of the 
proper orientation of philosophy: theocenticity.
5. Conclusion
The main thesis proposed in this article states that the role of God in 
Stein’s late anthropological theory is central. Let us recapitulate the crucial 
points mentioned.
First of all, the finitude of a man as a feature resulting in God being 
the center of man’s existence has been considered. In her treatment of the 
concept of finitude, Stein explicitly states that finitude simply calls for 
eternity. The logic of that very term is such that its antonym completes 
and – consequently – conditions it. One of those terms – finitude – apparently 
belongs to human experience, since it manifests itself in a number of ways: 
it is evident in the fact of a man having a temporal existence, marked with 
a beginning and end, in which certain gaps, interpreted as limitations, occur. 
As a result, a person is not completely understandable for oneself. All the 
above mentioned manifestations of the finitude lead up to a short, affirmative 
statement: finitude is a given. Once this is ascertained, an implication follows: 
if there is finitude then there must be eternity.
39 E. Stein, Die Frau, Freiburg 2010, Herder. English translation: Essays on Woman, trans. 
F. M. Oben, Washington 1996, ICS Publications.
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Eternity is the only framework in which the existent finitude finds its 
explanation: God is the creator of man and his origin; He also is the aim of each 
person’s life, thereby offering sense to the dynamic, evolving and incomplete 
being of man; God is a beholder of man’s life in status viae, sustaining his 
temporal, fragile existence and an endless source of inspiration to live it.
Secondly, Stein accepts an iconic structure of a human being: all men 
are icons of one triune God. The mark of this iconicity shapes the basic 
structure of a person into a threefold combination of a living body (Leib), 
spirit and a soul. The blending of those three is achieved by the form of 
a soul. It is not just the general structure that is dependent on God in Stein’s 
anthropology: each element of man’s structure is related to the eternal being 
in a fundamental way.
In her understanding of a body Stein accepts the hylomorphic relation of 
a soul and a living body. In her view, the body plays the role of the instrument 
for a spirit manifesting itself in personal acts and creations. This does not lead 
Stein to a Platonic kind of anti-somatic standpoint which would underplay 
man’s physicality. On the contrary, the body is dignified by the fact that it is 
a tool for spiritual substance. The body is a mirror reflecting the life of a soul 
and as such, it takes over the orientation towards God that is characteristic 
for the soul.
The description of a soul justifies accepting the literal meaning 
of theocentricity in Stein’s anthropology: a metaphor of the soul as 
a castle – adopted from St. Teresa of Avila’s The interior castle or the 
mansions – leads Stein to considerations of a most internal, central part of 
the soul, sometimes called the depth of a soul. The center is a domain where 
a human being encounters life that is not his own: at the depth of the soul 
a person might receive inspiration and movement coming from above. This 
is because the center is a channel of God’s grace, specifically placed in man 
in order to lead him towards his final goal. When external dealings with the 
world do not overshadow that deep central point, a person might reach the 
silent source. Then, it becomes a shelter in which one gains strength offered 
by God. Stein’s understanding of the center of a soul includes the fact that the 
center is a domain of God’s activity in a human being and, moreover, a sphere 
where God can be actually present. The latter expression is a most literal 
articulation of the theocentricity of Stein’s anthropology.
The person’s body-soul-spirit unity is a domain of the ego’s free exploration. 
In her post-conversion treatment of the ego, Stein discarded all egocentricity: 
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an ego was no more a principle of unity of a stream of consciousness. It 
became a moving, conscious eye which can lead the way into the depth of 
a soul. The role of a foundation of existence is played by the eternal being. 
Pure ego is merely an element in an iconic structure of a person.
The above listed elements of Stein’s anthropological reflection are reason 
enough to call her post-conversion reflection on man a theocentric one. The 
structure of a person in Stein’s late work becomes fully comprehensible only 
when placed within the ontological framework of God. Strictly speaking, 
the distinction between an ontological reflection on a human being and an 
ontological reflection on God is not at all sharp: a theocentric anthropology 
ceases to be merely anthropology – it rather is a sub-domain of a philosophy 
of God.
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